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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last two years, the public press has expressed differing views on whether the demise of 
Arthur Andersen is an anomaly or a systematic problem in the profession.  Some authors have 
asserted that Arthur Andersen was a firm somehow different than the other Big Five accounting 
firms while others in the public press believe that the failure of Andersen is the outcome of a 
systematic problem in the accounting profession.  In this study, I examine whether there is a 
difference between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five 
accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting.  I find that there is no difference between 
the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward 
aggressive financial reporting.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ver the last two years, much has been written in the public press concerning the fall of Arthur Andersen.  
In these writings, the authors provide an analysis of how the scandal unfolded, who the main players 
were, and the roles they played in the scandal.  These authors also present their beliefs on the changes 
that took place within Andersen and the accounting profession which led to the demise of the firm in 2002. 
 
 One book that has received much attention is Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed, and the Fall of Arthur 
Andersen by Barbara Ley Toffler.  In this book, the author described her four year experience as a partner of Arthur 
Andersen selling ethics programs to Andersen clients.  She noted that the firm’s founder was the very model of 
integrity, religiously following his maxim, “think straight, talk straight”.  However, the author asserted that the 
worldwide split in 2000 between Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting and other factors exposed the firm as the 
weakest of the Big Five Accounting firms. 
1
  She noted that after the spilt, Andersen was mainly concerned with 
revenue.  If a client was worth millions to the firm, then the firm did everything to ensure that the client would not 
change auditors. 
 
 In addition to the split between Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting, others in the public press have 
focused on other aspects that were unique to Andersen.  In a Business Week article, Byrne (2002) noted that Andersen 
was the only Big Five accounting firm that allowed a local partner to override the firm-wide internal team of 
accounting experts that reviewed complicated accounting issues facing local offices.  Lea (2002) noted that Andersen 
staff had a reputation for aggressive accounting and an unflagging commitment to their clients that exceeded other Big 
Five accounting firms.  This commitment was rewarded with a partner compensation package that was unmatched by 
any other accounting firm.   
 
 Despite the portrayal of Andersen as a firm somehow different than other Big Five accounting firms, others 
in the public press contend that the fall of Andersen should not be attributed to Andersen being somehow different.  
These authors believe that the demise of Andersen is not an anomaly but the outcome of a systematic problem in the 
public accounting profession.  Nusspickel (2002) stated that the failure of Andersen may be a signal of the change in 
audit methodologies by all of the Big Five accounting firms.  During the 1990's, the Big Five accounting firms 
changed their audit methodology from examining a large number of transactions to focusing more on processes and 
O 
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controls.  The author questioned whether the audit staff of the Big Five had enough training in these new 
methodologies to implement them successfully. 
 
 Others point to the fact that Arthur Andersen is not alone in fighting lawsuits from shareholders or dealing 
with complaints asserted by the SEC and IRS.  Fortune magazine noted that Pricewaterhouse Coopers is especially 
vulnerable because of a civil fraud complaint filed by the SEC for allowing Xerox to inflate its revenues by $3 billion 
between 1997 and 2000 (Kahn 2003).  The article also noted that Deloitte & Touche is under investigation because, 
along with Andersen, it helped Enron avoid $2 billion in taxes with complex offshore shelters.   
 
 In The CPA Journal, Goldwasser (2002) asserted that the fall of Andersen is indicative of a bigger problem in 
the accounting profession which is the economic importance of the client to the partner in charge of the audit.  The 
author believed that the SEC ignored this issue when it created its new independence rules in 2000.  If any further 
action is taken by the SEC, the author believes that the SEC should deal with this long-ignored issue. 
 
 Although the public press has expressed differing views on whether the demise of Andersen is an anomaly or 
a systematic problem in the profession, I have not identified any published empirical research that has examined 
whether there are unique aspects to Arthur Andersen that led to their collapse in 2002.  This paper will focus on the 
tolerance of Arthur Andersen toward aggressive financial reporting.  If the demise of Andersen was an anomaly, it 
would be reasonable to conclude that differences should exist between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the 
tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting.  Andersen’s willingness to 
allow Enron, WorldCom, and other companies to practice aggressive financial reporting has been well documented as 
a key factor in its demise. 
2
 
 
 The empirical issue examined in this paper is whether there is a difference between the tolerance of Arthur 
Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting.  If the results 
of this study suggest that a difference does exist, this would suggest that there were fundamental differences between 
Andersen and the other Big Five accounting firms.  However, if the results of this study suggest that there is no 
difference in the tolerance toward aggressive financial reporting between Andersen and the other Big Five accounting 
firms, this would provide some evidence that the fall of Andersen may be a signal of a systematic problem in the 
public accounting profession.  
 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
 There has been a large amount of research examining differences among public accounting firms.  Most of 
these studies have focused on differences between Big Five and non-Big Five accounting firms.  DeAngelo (1981) 
asserted that larger firms perform better audits because they have a greater reputation at stake, have more resources, 
and attract more highly skilled employees.  Some of these studies have found differences between Big Five and non-
Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 Krishnan (2003) examined whether the association between stock returns and discretionary accruals is 
different for clients of Big Five and non-Big Five accounting firms.  The author noted that the association between 
stock returns and discretionary accruals was greater for companies audited by Big Five accounting firms than for 
companies audited by non-Big Five accounting firms.  Krishnan (2003) also found that discretionary accruals of 
clients of Big Five accounting firms had a greater association with future profitability than discretionary accruals of 
clients of non-Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 Krishnan and Schauer (2000) examined whether not-for-profit entities’ compliance with eight GAAP 
reporting requirements is different among Big Five, large non-Big Five, and small non-Big Five accounting firms.  
The authors found that the extent of noncompliance decreases as one moves from small non-Big Five to the large non-
Big Five to the Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 Mutchler (1986) examined whether differences exist between Big Five and non-Big Five accounting firms in 
their propensity to issue a going concern modified report.  Her results suggested that Big Five accounting firms are 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Summer 2005                                                        Volume 21, Number 3 
 29 
more likely than non-Big Five accounting firms to issue a going concern modified report.  The author suggested that 
these findings indicate that larger firms are more willing to take a more conservative stance in issuing the appropriate 
opinion, have a better technical ability to detect the going concern issue, or have more clients with such issues.  
 
 Although many studies have examined whether differences exist between Big Five and non-Big Five 
accounting firms, there is very little empirical research examining whether differences exist among the Big Five 
accounting firms.  Most studies have grouped the Big Five accounting firms together and have not attempted to 
examine differences within this group. 
 
 Griner et al. (1994) examined whether the adoption of SAS No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, 
was associated with an increase in the incidence of uncertainties referenced in audit reports for each of the Big Five 
accounting firms and for all non-Big Five accounting firms.  The authors found that none of the Big Five accounting 
firms experienced a statistically significant increase while the non-Big Five accounting firms experienced a 
statistically significant increase.  The only Big Five accounting firm that experienced a marginally significant increase 
in the proportion of reports referencing uncertainties was Touche Ross, the smallest of the Big Five accounting firms 
in the time period under investigation. 
 
 Wheeler et al. (1993) examined whether differences exist among the Big Five accounting firms in their 
propensity to modify their audit reports for a change in accounting principle.  The results revealed no between-firm 
differences for accounting changes producing larger than four-percent income effects.  Significant between-firm 
differences were present for changes producing income effects of less than four percent and for accounting changes 
whose effects were explicitly described as immaterial in the financial statements. 
 
 Schultz (1993) examined whether differences exist among the Big Five accounting firms in the type of 
opinion received by companies defending pending litigation.  After controlling for a company’s financial condition 
and size, the author found that Big Five accounting firms differ in their tendency to modify audit reports for pending 
litigation. 
 
 Although there has been very little empirical research on the differences among the Big Five accounting 
firms, the fall of Arthur Andersen has brought this issue to the forefront.  It is important to examine whether the 
portrayal of Arthur Andersen as a firm somehow different than the other Big Five accounting firms by certain authors 
in the public press is supported by empirical evidence.  As we further investigate the fall of Arthur Andersen, the 
results of this study could assist in the discussion of this issue. 
 
METHODS 
 
 Accounting practitioners and academics have long recognized that earnings management is one of the main 
causes of aggressive financial reporting.  Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers [Dechow and Skinner (2000), Healy and Wahlen (1999)].   
 
 Earnings management cannot be observed directly.  Prior research in earnings management has focused on 
either the choice of accounting methods or the management of accruals.  DuCharme et al. (2001) noted that the 
management of accruals approach captures the subtle income management techniques allegedly used to avoid 
detection by outsider users.  Accruals not only reflect the choice of accounting methods but also the effect of 
recognition timing for revenues and expenses, asset write-downs, and changes in accounting estimates.  
 
 I measure discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional variation of the Jones (1991) accruals estimation 
model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995).  Subramanyam (1996) noted that the cross-sectional Jones model is 
generally better specified than its time-series counterparts.  The cross-sectional Jones model estimates "normal" 
accruals as a function of the change in revenue and the level of property, plant, and equipment.  The change in 
revenue is included because changes in working capital accounts, which are a part of total accruals, depend on 
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changes in revenue.  Property, plant, and equipment is included to control for the portion of total accruals related to 
non-discretionary depreciation expense.  The differences between total accruals and "normal" accruals are the 
discretionary accruals.  
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine whether there is a difference between the tolerance of Arthur 
Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting.  The level of 
earnings management, as measured by the cross-sectional Jones model, is used as the measure of an accounting firm’s 
tolerance toward aggressive financial reporting.  Firms that exhibit a lower level of earnings management practice less 
aggressive financial reporting.  
 
 In my multivariate analysis, discretionary accruals are regressed on a dummy variable indicating whether the 
company was audited by Arthur Andersen or the other Big Five accounting firms and several control variables.  These 
control variables attempt to control for other factors that could impact a company’s propensity to manage earnings.  
These factors include: 1) leverage, 2) operating cash flows, 3) size, 4) equity offerings, and 5) type of audit report.    
 
 Leverage may be positively or negatively associated with discretionary accruals.  Press and Weintrop (1990) 
found that closeness to the violation of debt covenants is associated with discretionary accrual choices.  DeAngelo et 
al. (1994) noted that troubled companies have large negative accruals because contractual renegotiations provide 
incentives to reduce earnings.  In contrast, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) found that highly leveraged firms have 
incentives to make income increasing discretionary accruals.  To control for the possible positive or negative effect of 
high leverage, I include a firm's debt to total assets as a measure of the amount of leverage. 
 
 Dechow et al. (1995) noted that discretionary accruals are negatively correlated with operating cash flows.  
Firms that have significant positive operating cash flows are in a better financial position than firms with negative 
operating cash flows and are less likely to practice earnings management.  To control for the possible effects of 
operating cash flows, I include a firm's operating cash flows to total assets. 
 
 Larger firms may have greater accrual-generating potential because of the difficulty that outsiders may have 
in distinguishing discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  Becker et al. (1998) found that the size of a firm is 
positively correlated with discretionary accruals.  Gillett and Uddin (2002) noted that a company's size is a good 
indication of a chief financial officer's intentions to report fraudulently.  To control for the possible effects of firm 
size, I include a firm's natural log of total assets.  
 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) noted that the evidence shows that at least some firms appear to manage earnings 
for stock market reasons.  Discretionary accruals should be positively correlated with equity offerings because 
managers will normally manage earnings upward in response to equity offerings.  To control for possible effects of 
equity offerings, I include the ratio of a firm's issuance of stock to total equity. 
 
 Francis and Krishnan (1999) found that auditors are less likely to issue a standard unqualified opinion for 
firms with high discretionary accruals.  To control for the possible effects that discretionary accruals have on the type 
of audit report issued, I include a dummy variable that measures whether or not a firm received a standard unqualified 
opinion.  Discretionary accruals should be negatively correlated with a standard unqualified opinion because auditors 
are less likely to issue a standard unqualified opinion for firms with high discretionary accruals. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
 My sample consists of firms with a fiscal year ending between August 1, 2000 and July 31, 2001.  On August 
7, 2000, an arbitrator for a Paris-based International Court of Arbitration granted Andersen Consulting their request to 
split from Arthur Andersen.  Toffler (2002) asserted that the worldwide split between Arthur Andersen and Andersen 
Consulting was a key factor that exposed the firm as the weakest of the Big Five accounting firms.  If differences 
existed between Arthur Andersen and the other Big Five accounting firms, these difference should be present at one of 
Andersen’s most vulnerable times, subsequent to the split between Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting.   
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 Companies audited by Non-Big Five accounting firms are excluded because the purpose of this study is to 
examine whether differences exist between Arthur Andersen and the other Big Five accounting firms.  This 
perspective is taken because the majority of the articles in the public press compared Andersen to the other Big Five 
accounting firms and did not compare Andersen to the non-Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 I excluded financial institutions with Standard Industrial Classifications (SICs) between 6000 and 6999 
because computing discretionary accruals for these firms is problematic.  Utility companies (SICs between 4000 and 
4999) are also excluded because the regulatory nature and unique financial reporting practices in this sector may make 
the incentives to manage earnings different from the incentives of non-regulated sectors.  I also eliminated firms that 
did not have the necessary data available on the Compustat database for the calculation of discretionary accruals.  This 
sample selection process yielded 1,288 firms from the 2002 Compustat database.  Of these firms, 199 firms were 
audited by Arthur Andersen and 1,089 firms were audited by the other Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study.  Table 2 provides parametric t-tests 
for differences between companies audited by Arthur Andersen and companies audited by the other Big Five 
accounting firms for estimated discretionary accruals, ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of operating cash flows to total 
assets, natural log of total assets, ratio of sale of stock to total equity, and type of audit report.   
 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
Companies audited by Arthur Andersen 
Companies audited by 
the other Big Five firms 
All Companies 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
DA -.0256 -.0187 .1110 -.0174 -.0100 .1104 -.0178 -.0119 .1107 
ANDERSEN 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .1572 0.00 .3652 
LEV 26.69 25.48 21.51 25.47 23.32 26.95 25.67 23.65 26.42 
OCF .0706 .0838 .1033 .0667 .0846 .1576 .0659 .0844 .1520 
SIZE 6.06 6.23 2.09 5.61 5.64 2.57 5.65 5.82 2.50 
ISSUE .2535 .0452 .6606 .2496 .0176 1.09 .2503 .0219 1.04 
REPORT .8514 1.00 .3567 .8113 1.00 .3915 .8250 1.00 .3864 
Where: 
DA  = estimated discretionary accruals 
ANDERSEN  = 1 if company was audited by Arthur Andersen, 0 otherwise 
LEV   = ratio of debt to total assets 
OCF  = ratio of operating cash flows to total assets 
SIZE = natural log of total assets 
ISSUE = ratio of sale of stock to total equity 
REPORT = 1 if standard unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 There is no statistically significant difference (t-value = 0.8991) in the estimated discretionary accruals for 
companies audited by Arthur Andersen and companies audited by the other Big Five accounting firms.  This finding 
suggests that there is no difference between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five 
accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting. 
 
 Except for the natural log of total assets (t-value = -2.1755), there is no statistically significant difference (all 
of the t-values < 1.30) in the ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of operating cash flows to total assets, ratio of sale of 
stock to total equity, and type of audit report for companies audited by Arthur Andersen and companies audited by the 
other Big Five accounting firms.  The significance of the natural log of total assets suggests that companies audited by 
Arthur Andersen were larger in size compared to companies audited by the other Big Five accounting firms. 
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Table 2: 
Parametric T-Tests for Differences between Companies Audited by  
Arthur Andersen and Companies Audited by the Other Big Five Accounting Firms 
Variables T-value P-value 
DA .8991 .3688 
LEV -.5641 .5728 
OCF -.3126 .7546 
SIZE -2.1755 .0298 
ISSUE -.0450 .9641 
REPORT -1.2617 .2073 
Where: 
DA  = estimated discretionary accruals 
LEV   = ratio of debt to total assets 
OCF   = ratio of operating cash flows to total assets 
SIZE  = natural log of total assets 
ISSUE  = ratio of sale of stock to total equity 
REPORT = 1 if standard unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 This finding suggests that one of the reasons Andersen may have failed was the size of their clients.  As has 
been noted, Arthur Andersen was not alone in fighting lawsuits from shareholders or dealing with complaints asserted 
by the SEC and IRS.  The failure of a client may have had a greater impact on Arthur Andersen than the other Big 
Five accounting firms because, on average, Andersen clients were larger. 
3
  Arthur Andersen was probably not more 
tolerant of aggressive financial reporting, as noted by the insignificance of the estimated discretionary accruals 
variable, but Andersen may have been more vulnerable because their clients were larger.    
 
 These conclusions are preliminary because this analysis does not control for other factors that could impact 
estimated discretionary accruals.  The next section presents the multivariate tests which include control variables for 
leverage, operating cash flows, size, equity offerings, and type of audit report.    
 
RESULTS 
 
 To test whether there is a difference in the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big 
Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting, estimated discretionary accruals are regressed on a 
dummy variable indicating whether the company was audited by Arthur Andersen or the other Big Five accounting 
firms and several control variables.  Leverage, operating cash flows, size, equity offerings, and type of audit report are 
included to control for the effects on discretionary accruals.  The OLS regression model is specified as follows for 
firm “i” in year “t”: 
 
DAit = "0 + "1 ANDERSENit + "2 LEVit + "3 OCFit + "4 SIZEit + "5 ISSUEit + "6 REPORTit + git  
 
Where: 
 
DAit   = estimated discretionary accruals 
ANDERSENit  = 1 if the company was audited by Arthur Andersen, 0 otherwise 
LEVit   = ratio of debt to total assets 
OCFit   = ratio of operating cash flows to total assets 
SIZEit   = natural log of total assets 
ISSUEit   = ratio of sale of stock to total equity 
REPORTit = 1 if standard unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise 
 
 In Table 3, I present the results of the OLS regression model.  The model's F-ratio of 12.134 indicates that the 
overall fit of the model is significant at p < 0.0001.  The adjusted R
2
 for the model is 8.98%.  The coefficient for the 
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ANDERSEN variable is not significant ( p = .2999) indicating that there is no difference in the estimated discretionary 
accruals of clients audited by Arthur Andersen and clients audited by the other Big Five accounting firms. 
 
 
Table 3: 
OLS Regression of Discretionary Accruals on Whether the  
Company was Audited by Arthur Andersen and Control Variables 
Independent Variable Predicted Sign Coefficients T-statistics P-value 
Intercept n\a -.0323 -2.665 .0078 
ANDERSEN ? .0096 1.037 .2999 
LEV ? -.0002 -1.303 .1929 
OCF - -.0865 -3.596 .0003 
SIZE + .0038 2.660 .0079 
ISSUE + -.0001 -0.24 .9808 
REPORT - -.0253 -2.815 .0050 
Where: 
ANDERSEN = 1 if company was audited by Arthur Andersen, 0 otherwise 
LEV   = ratio of debt to total assets 
OCF   = ratio of operating cash flows to total assets 
SIZE  = natural log of total assets 
ISSUE  = ratio of sale of stock to total equity 
REPORT = 1 if standard unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 The public press has expressed differing views on whether the demise of Arthur Andersen is an anomaly or a 
systematic problem in the profession.  This study suggests that Andersen was not different from the other Big Five 
accounting firms on at least one measure, tolerance toward aggressive financial reporting.  It is interesting to note that 
clients of Arthur Andersen were, on average, larger than the clients of the other Big Five Accounting firms, but there 
was no difference in the tolerance toward aggressive financial reporting. 
 
 Of the control variables included in the OLS regression model, operating cash flows, size, and type of audit 
report are significantly associated with discretionary accruals.  The negative coefficient on the operating cash flows 
variable is consistent with the belief that firms with significant positive operating cash flows are in a better financial 
position than firms with negative operating cash flows and are less likely to practice earnings management. 
 
 The positive coefficient on the size variable is consistent with the idea that larger firms have greater accrual-
generating potential because of the difficulty that outsiders may have in distinguishing discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals.  The negative coefficient on the type of audit report variable supports the notion that 
companies with a standard unqualified opinion are less likely to practice earnings management.  
 
 I performed several other tests for sensitivity analysis. First, the same regression model was run with the 
absolute value of estimated discretionary accruals assigned as the dependent variable.  The results of this regression 
model, not presented, are consistent with the previous results.  In this regression model, the coefficient for the 
ANDERSEN variable is not significant (p = .5050) indicating that there is no difference in the absolute value of the 
estimated discretionary accruals of clients audited by Arthur Andersen and clients audited by the other Big Five 
accounting firms.   
 
 To ensure that the results are not different under varying environments, the same regression model was run 
for companies with a fiscal year ending between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 1998 and January 1, 1999 and 
December 31, 1999.  Once again, the ANDERSEN variable was not significant.  This lack of significance held 
whether the dependent variable was estimated discretionary accruals or the absolute value of estimated discretionary 
accruals.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Over the last two years, much has been written in the public press concerning the fall of Arthur Andersen.  
Although the public press has expressed differing views on whether the demise of Andersen is an anomaly or a 
systematic problem in the profession, I have not identified any published empirical research that has examined 
whether there are unique aspects to Arthur Andersen that led to their collapse in 2002.  In this study, I examine 
whether there is a difference between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five 
accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting. 
 
 After controlling for leverage, operating cash flows, size, equity offerings, and type of audit report, I find that 
there is no difference between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five accounting 
firms toward aggressive financial reporting.  There are certain authors in the public press that have portrayed 
Andersen as a firm somehow different than the other Big Five accounting firms.  The results of this study do not 
support these authors’ beliefs on at least one measure, tolerance toward aggressive financial reporting. 
 
 It is interesting to note that the results from the univariate analysis suggest that companies audited by Arthur 
Andersen were larger in size when compared to companies audited by the other Big Five accounting firms.  Arthur 
Andersen may not have been more tolerant toward aggressive financial reporting, as noted by the insignificance of the 
discretionary accruals variable, but Andersen may have been more vulnerable because their clients were larger.  
 
 Although my results suggest that there is no difference between the tolerance of Arthur Andersen and the 
tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting, there may be other factors that 
differentiate Andersen from the other Big Five accounting firms.  The existence of these factors will limit the 
importance of the findings of this paper.  The results of this study are also dependent upon the accuracy of the cross-
sectional Jones model in measuring discretionary accruals.  To the extent it does not, my results may be biased.    
 
 Some authors have noted that the cleanup in Corporate America would probably have benefitted more had 
Andersen been reformed rather than killed.  Dwyer (2003) questions whether the surviving Big Four accounting firms 
are too few to be allowed to fail and, thus, are effectively beyond the reach of regulators.  As we begin to examine 
whether society would have benefited more had Andersen been reformed, the findings of this study should assist in 
these discussions.   
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Although the findings of this paper suggest that there is no difference between the tolerance of Arthur 
Andersen and the tolerance of the other Big Five accounting firms toward aggressive financial reporting, there may be 
other measures that differentiate Arthur Andersen and the other Big Five accounting firms.  An interesting avenue for 
future research is whether the governance structure of Andersen clients was different than the governance structure of 
clients of the other Big Five accounting firms.  Future research could also examine the impact of the fall of Arthur 
Andersen on stock returns.  It would be interesting to examine the extent that former Andersen clients’ stock returns 
were impacted by Andersen’s collapse. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. Although the previous research noted in this paper covers periods before and after mergers, the term “Big Five” is 
used to identify the largest international accounting firms before and after the mergers for convenience purposes. 
2. I recognize that other factors contributed to the fall of Andersen.  One factor that has received reasonable attention 
is the assertion that the SEC and the Department of Justice were waiting for a chance to make an example of a 
major accounting firm and it was unluckly for Andersen that one of its clients failed first.  (See Nusspickel (2002) 
for a more thorough discussion of this factor.) 
3. This statement does not assert that the size of the company was the only factor that contributed to the fall of Arthur 
Andersen.  Other factors, such as the influence of politics, should also be considered.  These factors are not part of 
this study and, thus, are not discussed in this paper. 
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